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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF WILL SUBSTITUTES
The purpose of this Article is to raise what seems to be a neglected area
in the law of decedents' estates. What are the rights of creditors in assets
which shift ownership or enjoyment of property at death by various will
substitutes? These are sometimes called nonprobate assets because they are
not subject to administration in the decedent's probate estate. Increasingly,
a major portion of decedents' wealth is being transmitted to others not
through the probate process but through a variety of devices which have
acquired the label "nontestamentary." Some of these devices, like joint ten-
ancy and gifts causa mortis, have long been legally accepted. Others, like
revocable living trusts (with extreme variations, such as Totten bank ac-
counts and Dacey trusts) and contractual benefits payable on death to des-
ignated beneficiaries, are developments of relatively recent origin.
At the outset, one must wonder why creditor groups have not been
vocal about the drain of available assets from the probate estate. One possi-
ble explanation is that concern for creditors is misplaced. Contract credi-
tors rely on security arrangements; retail organizations protect themselves
by purchasing insurance against the risk of death of debtors or are content
to write losses off on income tax returns; tort creditors sue primarily for the
amount of insurance coverage. Interesting is the fact that during the prepa-
ration of the Uniform Probate Code (the Code) no credit organization
voiced any comments on proposed claims procedures with the single excep-
tion of the American Association of Trial Lawyers, which was concerned
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University.
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only with tort liability.' With regard to nonprobate assets, joint tenancy
has long been a device that defeats unsecured creditors of the joint tenant
who dies first; yet the one state which had legislation to protect such credi-
tors has repealed the statute.2 Of course, one major creditor at death, the
United States Government, has enacted its own procedure to reach taxable
will substitutes if the probate estate is insufficient to pay estate taxes.
3
Institutional creditors therefore are likely to be able to protect them-
selves. It is the individual creditor who may be hurt most and who has no
organization to speak on his behalf. The cases that are likely to occur with
increasing frequency involve the divorced wife or child who has a claim by
reason of a property settlement, separation agreement, or divorce decree.
4
The divorced husband may remarry and arrange his property to pass to a
1. Langrock, Uniforn Probate Code.- What Price Certainty?, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept,
1970, at 23.
2. See note 31 infra.
3. Although the Internal Revenue Code places primary responsibility for pay-
ment of the estate tax on the "executor" (the personal representative), any person in
actual or constructive possession of any of the decedent's property is treated by
statutory definition as an executor if none is appointed. I.R.C. §§ 2002, 2203
(1976). Moreover, the government may rely on its general tax lien or the special
estate tax lien on the gross estate. See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiF-r TAXES §§ 21.15, .20 (1974).
4. The concept that a divorced spouse's duty to pay alimony or support ends
with his death is eroding rapidly. The divorce court can order one spouse to pay
alimony or support to the other spouse until the latter's death or remarriage, even if
the former dies first. See, e.g., Cross v. Cross, 5 Ill. 2d 456, 125 N.E.2d 488 (1955);
Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982); DeRiemer v. Old Nat'l Bank, 60 Wash.
2d 686, 374 P.2d 973 (1962). The obligation may be made a charge upon the estate
of the obligor. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956). Sup-
port of a minor child may be made an obligation extending beyond the death of the
divorced parent. For example, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-327 (Supp. 1982-1983)
provides:
C. Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the
decree, provisions for the support of a minor child are not terminated by
the death of a parent obligated to support the child. When a parent obli-
gated to pay support dies, the amount of future support may be modified,
revoked or commuted to a lump sum payment to the extent just and ap-
propriate in the circumstances and shall have priority equal to the right
for family allowance in § 14-2403. Past due support shall have priority
equal to claims provided for in § 14-3805, subsection A, paragraph 6.
Property division rights clearly survive the death of the obligor. Frequently, an
order for property division will provide for installment payments by one spouse to
the other, but unless made a lien on specific property, the right to payments would
constitute only a general obligation, normally payable out of the probate estate. If
the obligor puts property in joint tenancy with a second spouse, creates a revocable
trust, or makes other nontestamentary arrangements in favor of the second spouse
for the purpose of defeating that obligation, the courts should on petition of the first
spouse set aside the particular transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.
[Vol. 48
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss2/6
CREDITORS & NONPROBA TE ASSETS
second wife by nonprobate devices. In re Granwell,5 a New York Court of
Appeals case, is illustrative. Under a separation agreement between Leslie
Granwell and his first wife, their son was entitled to half of Leslie's estate
and also to the proceeds of certain life insurance policies. Subsequent to the
divorce, Leslie remarried. He later changed the beneficiary on some of the
life insurance policies, purchased mutual funds in joint tenancy with his
second wife, and established revocable trusts designating the second wife as
remainderman. The purchase of the mutual funds did not render the hus-
band insolvent at that time. His estate was administered by the second wife
as executrix. After payment of funeral expenses and other debts the pro-
bate assets were nominal. The son sought to hold the second wife liable for
unpaid support payments from the date of death until he reached majority
and for half of the mutual funds.' As for the trusts, the son was fortunate
because New York statutory law protects creditors of revocable trusts.7 The
mutual funds were a different problem, involving joint ownership with
right of survivorship, but the court of appeals treated half the funds as pass-
ing at death and hence as a conveyance fraudulent at that time as to the son
as a creditor.8 Because the son received more life insurance proceeds than
the agreement called for, there was no issue as to the life insurance. Obvi-
ously, a "creditor" such as the decedent's son may receive more judicial
help, for policy reasons, than other general creditors.
Still another explanation for the lack of creditor interest may be that in
the majority of decedents' estates there are sufficient probate assets to meet
claims of unsecured creditors. Only if the probate estate is inadequate for
creditors is there a problem. A system that permits nonprobate assets to
pass free of creditor claims therefore may be tolerable to creditors. Unfortu-
nately, we have no empirical data to assess the validity of this explanation.
In the preparation of the Uniform Probate Code, the draftsmen early
raised the policy question whether the Code was to deal only with the pro-
bate estate or with nonprobate assets as well. The decision was made to
generally cover only the probate estate. Hence in most Code sections no
attempt was made to deal with correlative problems regarding nonprobate
assets. For example, divorce operates to revoke will provisions for the di-
vorced spouse.9 There is a similar problem as to life insurance payable to
the divorced spouse or bank accounts "in trust for" or "payable on death
to" the divorced spouse, but there is no Code provision. The Code provides
a nonexoneration rule for specific devises"° but does not deal with the same
5. 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1967).
6. Id at 94, 228 N.E.2d at 781, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
7. N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 10-7.2 (McKinney 1967). See City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943) (constru-
ing the earlier New York provision, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 145 (repealed 1964)).
8. 20 N.Y.2d at 97, 228 N.E.2d at 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
9. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (1975).
10. Id § 2-609.
1983]
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problem where life insurance is pledged. When specifically devised prop-
erty is destroyed, insurance proceeds payable after death belong to the devi-
see under the Code's nonademption rule," but the Code does not extend to
proceeds of insurance on joint tenancy property. The Code does not cover
powers of appointment, except for the single section relating to exercise by a
general devise of the whole estate or of the residue.1
2
Exceptions to the general policy limiting the Code to probate assets
can be found in sections 2-801 " (disclaimer), 2-803 4 (effect of homicide on
succession), and 2-202'" (the "augmented estate"). Late in the preparation
of the Code it was decided to add an article on nonprobate transfers, but
this was limited to multiple-party accounts in financial institutions and to a
single section on contractual provisions for payment or transfer at death. 6
The last section may well prove to be a sleeper because of its broad word-
ing, although to date it has not been widely used so far as I know. Finally, a
skeleton article on trusts was added to the Code,' 7 with the hope that enact-
ing states would add other relevant uniform laws such as the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act. a
In development of the numerous devices to bypass probate, litigation
has centered on alleged violations of the statute of wills. If the arrange-
ments seem to provide safeguards against fraud similar to those in the stat-
ute of wills, courts have been willing to hold the arrangement
nontestamentary.' 9 But probate, used in the broad sense of administration
of a decedent's estate, serves other purposes than assuring succession to the
persons intended by the decedent. Protecting the family against disinheri-
tance is one; providing a convenient forum for creditors is another. Remov-
ing assets from the probate estate by will substitutes has posed a problem
for the surviving spouse in those states where marital rights at death are
defined in terms of an elective share in the probate estate.2" Significantly,
the trend toward transmitting wealth by will substitutes led first to frequent
11. Id § 2-608.
12. Id § 2-610.
13. Id. § 2-801.
14. Id § 2-803.
15. Id § 2-202.
16. Id §§6-101 to 6-113, 6-201.
17. Id §§ 7-101 to 7-307.
18. UNIF. TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT §§ 1-13 (1964).
19. Professor Browder has noted the inadequacy of this approach:
It may be argued that modern creditors do not really need the kind of
protection suggested here. If there is such a policy, courts can assert it
without distorting the law respecting the testamentary effect of transfers
that purport to be inter vivos. Again, a conveyance can be testamentary
with respect to creditors without being testamentary for all purposes.
Browder, Giving or Leaving--What is a Will?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 845, 885 (1977).
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litigation and judicial development of various concepts to extend spousal
protection to the nonprobate assets and later in many states to legislation
defining the share in terms of both the probate estate and the nonprobate
assets passing by will substitutes.2 Lack of extensive creditor litigation may
therefore mean that there is no corresponding need for creditor protection.
One subsidiary problem relates to the effect of nonclaim statutes on the
right of creditors to pursue nonprobate assets. For example, section 3-803 of
the Uniform Probate Code bars unpresented claims "against the estate, the
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent."22
There is no bar against the takers of nonprobate assets unless the courts
would extend the statute by analogy. Some practicing lawyers therefore
recommend against use of will substitutes where potential claims may be
outstanding after death,2 3 as use of probate serves to cut off such claims if
they are not presented in the administration of the estate and thus insulates
the probate assets when distributed to the successors.
II. EXISTING LAW.
A. Joint Tenany
Included here are all of the forms ofjoint ownership that pass complete
ownership to the survivor: ordinary joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety
(in states still permitting such a tenancy), tenancy with express survivorship
(in states which have legislation abolishing joint tenancy but whose courts
have permitted a right of survivorship to be grafted onto a tenancy in com-
mon by express wording in the creating instrument), and joint life estates
with a contingent remainder in the survivor. Probably because the right of
survivorship in joint tenancy antedates the first Statute of Wills in 1540,24 it
has never been questioned as a violation of that statute.
The ancient theory of joint tenancy is that each of the joint tenants
owns the whole and that when one dies, his interest ceases and the survivor
or survivors merely continue to own what was held before. Hence the credi-
tor of the deceased joint tenant is left with no right against the joint tenancy
property, his debtor's interest having ceased at death.2 5 Even if the creditor
had a judgment lien on the debtor's real property, his lien is on the debtor's
interest which ceases at death.26 Only if the creditor forces a sale of the
21. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981 &
Supp. 1982-1983).
22. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (1975).
23. Moore, The Advantages of Probate, 10 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 416.1 (1976).
24. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1.
25. See, e.g., De Forge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956); In re
Estate of Harris, 88 Misc. 2d 60, 387 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sur. Ct. 1976), afd, 61 A.D.2d
881, 402 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1978). See also 4A R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 618, at
676 (1982); 4 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1790 (1961 & Supp. 1978).
26. People's Trust & Say. Bank v. Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 469, 160 N.E. 85, 86
(1927); Elder v. Rothamel, 202 Md. 189, 192, 95 A.2d 860, 862 (1953), noted in 14
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debtor's interest by levy of execution during his debtor's lifetime, and
thereby effects a severance of the joint tenancy, can the creditor prevail. 7
Although the creation of the joint tenancy may itself be a fraudulent
conveyance, the creator usually is solvent at that time. Moreover, creation
of the joint tenancy still leaves the creator with a half interest which he can
sever and which creditors can reach during his lifetime. Technically, when
the joint tenant debtor dies, nothing "passes" to the survivor by his survi-
vorship right; before the death of one, the other joint tenant could only
convey half, but after the death he can convey the whole. The New York
Court of Appeals in the Granwell decision,28 discussed earlier, allowed the
creditor of the deceased creator of the joint tenancy to reach half.29 To do
otherwise, Chief Judge Fuld stated, "would violate the spirit and purpose of
both the Surrogate's Court Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances
Act."' 30 The cases holding that a judgment lien against the interest of the
deceased joint tenant is lost at death can be distinguished; those cases were
not argued on the theory that there was a fraudulent conveyance at the
MD. L. REV. 151 (1954); Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 433, 272
N.W. 657, 658 (1937). In states which follow the lien theory of mortgages, in the
absence of statute a mortgage by one joint tenant does not sever the joint tenancy,
and on the death of the mortgagor the survivingjoint tenant owns the whole free of
the mortgage lien. See, e.g., People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 291, 294, 330 P.2d
858, 860-61 (1958), noted in 47 Ky. L.J. 565 (1959). Liens may be preserved by
special statute, so that the surviving joint tenant takes the interest which the de-
ceased joint tenant could have transferred prior to death subject to the lien. See,
e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.24 (West 1981). In protecting the surviving joint ten-
ant against creditors of the other deceased joint tenant, courts have rejected a the-
ory of unjust enrichment. See Schlichenmayer v. Luithle, 221 N.W.2d 77 (N.D.
1974).
27. See, e.g., Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. App. 449, 453, 61 N.E.2d 358, 360
(1945); Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 394, 244 P.2d 781, 782 (1952). The point
at which severance takes place in the process of levy is itself an issue of litigation.
The extreme position is that no severance takes place even at the time of sale, but
only when the sheriff has executed a deed of conveyance. See Jackson v. Lacey, 408
Ill. 530, 531, 97 N.E.2d 839, 840 (1951).
28. In re Granwell, 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1967).
29. Id at 95, 228 N.E.2d at 782, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 786. The court relied on an
early English case, Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 477, 26 Eng. Rep. 688 (1742), but
may have misread it. An English source treats Stileman as a case in which the origi-
nal purchase of land was impeachable as a fraudulent conveyance because "made
for the purpose of safeguarding the transferor, or his family, at a time when he is
about to enter upon a speculative business, or one of which he has no special knowl-
edge," even though the debt was incurred later. 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENG-
LAND 367 (4th ed. 1977). At the time Stileman was decided, the statute governing
the writ of elegit, which the creditor chose to use in that case, provided that only
half of the land could be reached. This accounts for the result in Stileman. See the
opinion on rehearing.
30. 20 N.Y.2d at 95, 228 N.E.2d at 782, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
[Vol. 48
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time of death. However, they are inconsistent in theory with the concept
that there is a conveyance or transfer at death. Only one state ever enacted
legislation to allow creditors of a deceased joint tenant to proceed against
the surviving tenant, and that state has repealed its legislation."1 In view of
the high frequency of joint tenancy as a form of ownership, it is both odd
and perhaps significant that similar legislation has not been enacted
elsewhere.3
2
Tenancies by the entirety still exist in a number of common law states,
but the legal effect of such tenancies during the marriage varies widely. 3
In some states a creditor of one spouse may not reach property held as ten-
ant by the entirety with the other spouse. In other states the creditor can
levy only on the life interest of the spouse and on that spouse's right as
survivor (in effect a contingent remainder) or only on the right to take as
survivor.3 4 However, at the death of one spouse a tenancy by the entirety
has the same survivorship feature as traditional joint tenancy and would
belong to the surviving spouse free of claims of creditors of the decedent.
Only if the debt were a joint obligation of both could the property be
reached in the hands of the survivor.
The other variant on joint tenancy is the joint life estate with contin-
gent remainder to the survivor. This closely resembles tenancy by the en-
tirety but is not limited to the husband-wife situation. Again the creditors
31. In 1955, the Nebraska legislature enacted NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-624 (1956)
(repealed 1977). Although the original bill would have made the jointly owned
property subject to the creditor claim, the act as passed provided only for personal
liability of the survivor, within stated limits (notably the amount contributed to the
jointly owned property by the decedent). For a review of the statute, see Comment,
Liabiity of SurvivingJoint Tenantfor Debts of DeceasedJoint Owner, 40 NEB. L. REv. 153
(1960). The statute was repealed in 1977 when Nebraska adopted the Uniform
Probate Code. The repeal was deliberate and was not an oversight. See Nebraska
Comment to L.B. 354, § 288 (1973). Attempts to broaden the present NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-2707 (1979), which corresponds to UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-107
(1975), to empower the personal representative of an insolvent estate to proceed
against surviving joint tenants of real and personal property as well as survivors on
multiple-party financial accounts have been unsuccessful, mainly due to opposition
from women's groups. Letter from Professor John M. Grawohl, University of Ne-
braska, to the author (Mar. 1, 1982).
32. In 1962, as part of a project to revise the Wisconsin property statutes, the
author suggested a statutory change to provide a remedy for creditors. R. Effland,
Study Memorandum on Joint Tenancies in Real Property (Oct. 1, 1962). The Wis-
consin State Bar Committee was not receptive.
33. The present status of tenancy by the entirety in the United States, and the
legal consequences of such tenancies, are summarized in 4A R. POWELL, supra note
25, 620-624.1. The power of creditors to reach such tenancies is discussed at
length in G. THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 1790.
34. See, e.g., In re Dawson, 10 Bankr. 680 (D. Tenn. 1981) (only debtor's right of
survivorship could be sold by trustee, debtor having power to elect to claim exemp-
tions under local law, here Tennessee law on tenancies by the entirety).
1983]
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of one of the co-owners can only reach that owner's interest, which is a life
estate (as tenant in common) plus a contingent remainder. On the death of
the debtor his interest ceases and the survivor's contingent remainder
vests. 5 The creditor is left out in the cold.
B. Gifts Causa Mort'
Of all the will substitutes, this is both the most flagrant and one of the
most ancient. Such gifts are confined to personal property but can apply to
choses in action as well as tangible personalty. Because of the similarity
between gifts causa mortis, which require an imminent peril of death, and
nuncupative wills, some courts have imposed strict requirements on gifts
causa mortis. Other courts seem willing to allow gifts causa mortis on mea-
ger evidence of delivery. In Scberer v. Hyland,6 the donor endorsed a check
payable to her and left it with two handwritten notes, one of which "be-
queathed" to the donee all her possessions specifically including the check.
The donor then left her apartment and committed suicide. The New Jersey
Supreme Court found that these acts constituted sufficient delivery and sus-
tained the gift causa mortis.3 7 The transaction would have been treated as
a valid holographic will in a jurisdiction recognizing such wills. Here the
line between a will and a gift causa mortis was in reality nonexistent.
In theory, the gift causa mortis passes title upon delivery of the chattel
but is subject to revocation by the donor and is automatically revoked if the
donor survives the peril which motivated the gift."8 Realistically, it is only
fully effective upon the death of the donor. But even if immediately effec-
tive, the transfer itself renders the donor insolvent in cases where the estate
remaining for probate is inadequate; hence it would be fraudulent as to
creditors and the property should be reachable.3 9
C. Revocable Living Trusts
Widespread use of the revocable living trust in the last several decades
seems to provide a major loophole in the protection afforded creditors by
the probate process.' ° The settlor of the trust normally retains both the full
income for life and the power to revoke, alter, or amend the trust. If only
35. See Hughes v. Fairfield Lumber & Supply Co., 143 Conn. 427, 123 A.2d
195 (1956) ("survivorship" deed; interest of one tenant dies with him, so survivor
takes free of claim even if land is attached during lifetime).
36. 75 N.J. 127, 380 A.2d 698 (1977).
37. Id at 135, 380 A.2d at 702.
38. R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.19 (3d ed. 1975).
39. "It is well recognized that a gift causa mortis will not be permitted to de-
feat the claims of creditors of the decedent, and that any part of such gift necessary
for the payment of debts must be surrendered." Railey v. Railey, 30 F. Supp. 121,
123 (D.D.C. 1939).
40. Not all living trusts operate to defeat creditors. Some trust instruments
contain a direction to the trustee to pay funeral expenses, taxes, and debts if the
Vol. 48
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the income is reserved, with no power to revoke, alter, or amend, the settlor
is subject to an immediate gift tax on the value of the trust minus his life
interest.4 ' At death, the trust corpus is included in his gross estate for estate
tax purposes, with credit for the gift tax.4 2 If no income is reserved but only
a power to revoke, the trust income is nevertheless taxed to the settlor.
4 3
There is no completed gift because of the power to revoke, and hence no gift
tax,4' but the corpus is included in the settlor's estate at death.45 The set-
tlor obtains no tax advantage by either arrangement alone, only tax disad-
vantage. Revocable trusts with reserved income are therefore created for
non-tax reasons; one principal reason is to minimize the delay and cost of
probate.
Modern law permits the settlor to retain not only income for life and a
power to revoke, but various lesser powers such as the power to withdraw
principal or trust corpus, to control changes in trust investments, and to
exercise other administrative powers.4 6 The settlor can even create the trust
by a declaration making himself sole trustee.4 7 All that has been trans-
ferred by the declaration of trust is an equitable future interest which can
be revoked or altered at will by the settlor in the exercise of his reserved
powers. The interest of the other trust beneficiaries is tenuous at best, but it
is enough to justify the courts in holding the trust nontestamentary.48
Again the courts have been concerned not with creditors but with formali-
ties of execution. Some of the early attacks on revocable living trusts were
by disappointed spouses who simply wanted to bring the trust assets into
the probate estate in order to elect a share; attorneys for the disappointed
spouses later developed more sophisticated theories in their effort to reach
the trust despite its nonprobate status.4 9
What of creditors?5 ° Here the law has been dominated strongly by the
probate estate is insufficient, although it is more common to give the trustee a dis-
cretionary rather than mandatory power.
41. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1973).
42. I.R.C. § 2036 (Supp. V 1981).
43. Id. §§ 671, 674 (1976).
44. See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283 (1933).
45. I.R.C. § 2038 (1976).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1959); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES §§ 103, 104 (2d ed. 1965); 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 57
(3d ed. 1967).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 100 (1959).
48. See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955). Even
"Dacey" trusts have been upheld. See Barnette v. McNulty, 21 Ariz. App. 127, 516
P.2d 583 (1973).
49. The concepts of the illusory trust and of constructive fraud have been vari-
ously used. See W. MACDONALD, supra note 20, at 125-26.
50. A number of commentaries deal with rights of creditors in revocable trusts.
See Alexander, Certain Problems Confronting Creditors When a Revocable Trust Accomplishes
Testamentaty Succession, 31 MICH. L. REv. 449 (1933); Goldman, Rights of the Spouse
1983]
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Restatement of Trusts position that a power to revoke is only a "power"
and not "property."5 1 Hence, in the absence of statute, creditors cannot
reach the principal of a revocable trust either during the settlor's lifetime or
after his death.5 2 While one can appreciate the utility of Hohfeldian termi-
nology, the distinction here is completely unrealistic. To say that the set-
tlor, who can obtain possession and title to the trust corpus by executing
and delivering to the trustee a document of revocation, has no "property"
would shock a non-lawyer. If the same person has money on deposit with a
bank which he can withdraw on proper application to the bank, the law has
no hesitance in saying that he has property. That a settlor who has a right
to all the income from the trust assets and a power to shift the benefit of
corpus to himself or others at will is treated as having only a limited income
interest, a life estate, is anomalous.
Note the glaring inconsistency of the Restatement position on two
comparable problems. If the same settlor had no power to revoke but gave
the trustee a discretionary power to pay the principal to the settlor, the
settlor's creditors could reach the principal.53 If the same settlor reserved
not a power to revoke but a general power of appointment, again the credi-
tors could reach the principal.54 Why should a power to revoke, which is a
greater power, mean that the creditors are left with no rights?
The Restatement position for years was not a complete bar to creditors
during the settlor's lifetime because the federal Bankruptcy Act contained a
provision giving the trustee in bankruptcy all the powers of the bankrupt.
5 5
Hence in the extreme case the creditor could throw the settlor into bank-
ruptcy and thereby make the trust assets available to satisfy claims. Unfor-
tunately, the recent revision of the Bankruptcy Act eliminates this
particular provision, and the Act is now phrased in terms of "property.
'1) 6
If the Restatement is used in interpreting the new Act, the principal of the
trust will be exempt. The federal courts hopefully will give a broader inter-
and the Creditor in Inter ivos Trusts, 17 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1948); Schuyler, Revocable
Trusts--Spouses, Creditors and Other Predators, 8 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 74.1300-.1304
(1974).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 comment o (1959). Courts
have tended to follow and cite the Restatement. See, e.g., Murphy v. C.I.T. Corp.,
347 Pa. 591, 33 A.2d 16 (1943).
52. The leading case is Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1879).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959). For an illustrative
case, see Ware v. Gulda, 331 Mass. 68, 117 N.E.2d 137 (1954).
54. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 328 (1940). A recent case applying the
rule is United States v. Ritter, 558 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1977). See Note, Trusts-
Powers-Rights of Subsequent Creditors in Corpus of Trust Fund Set Up by Debtor Reserving
Life Estate and General Power of Appointment, 19 MINN. L. REv. 328 (1935).
55. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(3), 30 Stat. 544, 564 (1898) (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(3) (1976) (repealed 1978)).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. V 1981).
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pretation.5 7 But on the settlor's death, the bankruptcy remedy is worthless
anyway. Bankruptcy is not available against a decedent. Moreover, the
power to revoke is not exercisable after the settlor's death.
With death of the settlor, his life income interest (which is available to
creditors despite any spendthrift clause) and his power to revoke end. The
usual clause reserving the power to revoke requires that it be exercised by
an instrument executed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee during
the settlor's lifetime; it cannot be exercised by will.58 The trust assets do not
become part of the probate estate. Ownership has been effectively shifted
from the decedent.
One theory for reaching the revocable trust after death is simply that
such a trust remains the property of the settlor. The law should give effect
to realities.5 9 The difficulty is that a court may accept the argument of the
beneficiaries and the trustee that if the settlor's interest is property during
his lifetime, it ceases at death, just as a life estate ceases. How can a creditor
meet this argument? One response might be that if there is no completed
transfer of the beneficial interest during the settlor's lifetime, the transfer
takes place at death. Since it results in making insolvent the probate estate
available for creditors, the transfer at death is a fraudulent conveyance
which the personal representative can sue to set aside. The law does treat a
revocable trust as effective during lifetime so far as the need to comply with
the statute of wills is concerned. But the same trust is treated as not effec-
tive until death for most other purposes: inclusion in the gross taxable es-
tate for federal estate tax purposes, 6 computation of the beginning of the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities,6" and inclusion in the augmented
estate available for the elective share under the Uniform Probate Code
62
and similar statutory schemes to protect the disinherited spouse. 63 If the
revocable trust is realistically viewed as a transfer at death, and it leaves the
assets available for creditors through the probate process inadequate to
meet claims, it should be a transfer in fraud of existing creditors under the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which is in force in twenty-six
57. The relevant section now provides: "Property of the estate does not include
any power that the debtor may only exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other
than the debtor." Id. The clear implication is that "property" does include a power
to revoke.
58. RESTATEMENT .(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 comment j (1959). See Con-
necticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 262 N.W.2d 403
(Minn. 1977).
59. As Mr. Justice Brandeis put it, "[Tlhe logic of words should yield to the
logic of realities." Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927).
60. I.R.C. § 2038 (1976).
61. See A. SIMES & L. SMITH, THE LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1252 (2d ed.
1956). See also Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958).
62. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1975) (inclusion in "augmented estate").
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states.6' Moreover, under many probate codes, 65 including the Uniform
Probate Code,66 the personal representative has the exclusive right to re-
cover this property to the extent necessary to pay unsecured debts of the
decedent. Hence troublesome questions about how and when the claimant
should proceed to establish his claim are avoided by channeling all claims
through the regular administration process.
If two cases can be considered a modern trend, a new judicial rule may
be developing. In State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Reiser,6 a 1979 case, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court allowed an unsecured creditor to reach assets
in a revocable living trust after the death of a settlor whose probate estate
was insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim. The court pointed out the
Restatement position that creditors can reach property transferred in trust
if the settlor reserves a life estate and a general power of appointment and if
the probate estate is insufficient to meet the claims of creditors. 68 Justice
Kass reasoned:
There has developed, however, another thread of decisions
which takes cognizance of, and gives effect to, the power which a
person exercises in life over property. When a person has a general
power of appointment, exercisable by will or by deed, and exer-
cises that power, any property so appointed is, in equity, consid-
ered part of his assets and becomes available to his creditors in
preference to the claims of his voluntary appointees or lega-
tees. . . . These decisions rest on the theory that as to property
which a person could appoint to himself or his executors, the
property could have been devoted to the payment of debts and,
therefore, creditors have an equitable right to reach that property.
It taxes the imagination to invent reasons why the same analysis
and policy should not apply to trust property over which the set-
tlor retains dominion at least as great as a power of appointment.
The Restatement of Property has, in fact, translated the doctrine
applicable to powers of appointment to trusts: "When a person
transfers property in trust for himself for life and reserves a gen-
eral power to appoint the remainder and creates no other benefi-
cial interests which he cannot destroy by exercising the power, the
property, though the power is unexercised, can be subjected to the
payment of the claims of creditors of such person and claims
against his estate to whatever extent other available property is
insufficient for that purpose." ...
. . . It is excessive obeisance to the form in which property is
held to prevent creditors from reaching property placed in trust
under such terms.69
64. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 1-14 (1918).
65. See 2 BANCROFT'S PROBATE PRACTICE § 475 (1950).
66. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-710 (1975).
67. 389 N.E.2d 768 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
68. Id at 770.
69. Id at 771 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 328 (1940)).
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The Supreme Court of Oregon reached a similar result where the debt-
ors had transferred all of their assets into a revocable living trust.70 Al-
though the plaintiffs claim for wages for nursing services was allowed in
probate, there were no assets in the probate estate. The plaintiff, who had
been appointed personal representative, brought a creditor's suit in her in-
dividual capacity and as personal representative against the trustee and the
trust beneficiaries. Her theory was that creation of the trust was a fraudu-
lent conveyance. 71 Although the court could have relied on an old Oregon
statute,7 '2 it chose instead to use the analogy of the life-estate-general-power-
of-appointment cases; like the Massachusetts court, the Oregon court saw
no real difference between the power to revoke and a power to appoint.73
The inadequacy of common law doctrine is demonstrated by a number
of state statutes intended to provide creditors of the settlor of a revocable
trust with a remedy against the trust assets. These statutes are basically of
two types. One is patterned on a 1487 English statute,74 while the other is
based on a New York statute, originally enacted as part of the 1830 Revised
Statutes of New York.75
Unfortunately, the existing statutes fail to deal expressly with the prob-
lem of the creditor after the holder of the power of revocation dies. The
result is that a court may construe a statute as applicable during the life of
the settlor, but not after death when the power is no longer exercisable.
76
Even the modern revision of the Wisconsin statute,7 which I plead guilty to
70. Johnson v. Commercial Bank, 284 Or. 675, 588 P.2d 1096 (1978).
71. Id. at 679, 588 P.2d at 1098.
72. OR. REV. STAT. § 95.060 (1981).
73. 284 Or. at 681, 588 P.2d at 1099.
74. 3 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1487). It is only fitting that an English statute enacted in
1487 be cited in an article which is part of a symposium dedicated to Professor
William Fratcher. His extensive knowledge of English legal history and his love for
the old statutes that make up part of the lore of ancient English land law are well
known to his professional friends and former students. Henry's statute provided:
"All deeds of gift of goods and chattels made or to be made of trust, to the use of
that person or persons that made the same deed of gift be void and of none effect."
American statutes based on this English model are listed in 2 A. ScOTT, supra note
46, § 156 n.5.
75. The section, which is now repealed, read, "Where the grantor in a convey-
ance reserves to himself for his own benefit, an absolute power of revocation, he is
thereafter deemed still to be the absolute owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the
rights of his creditors and purchasers are concerned." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 163
(1964) (current version at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-10.6 (McKinney
1967)). Statutes based on this New York prototype are collected in 4 A. SCoTT,
supra note 46, § 330.12 n.8.
76. See, e.g., Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119
(1939) (based in part on wording of Ohio statute).
77. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.07(3) (West 1981) provides:
If a settlor retains a power to revoke, modify or terminate which is
exercisable in his own favor, except when such power is exercisable only in
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drafting, is not explicit on this point. Because the creditor can reach the
property in a revocable trust to the extent that the property "is subject to
such power," an argument can be made that after death of the settlor the
trust is no longer subject to the power and hence is immune from creditors.
This was certainly not the intent behind such a provision, and a court
should not yield to so technical an argument in modern times.
D. Mult'ple-Party Bank Accounts
Three forms of bank accounts have been utilized to shift ownership of
the account at death from the depositor to another person or persons:
(1) The account may be opened in the name of the depositor "in
trust for" another person. These are often called Totten trusts after the
early New York case in which such accounts were held permissible as will
substitutes.7" The Restatement labels these "tentative" trusts;79 I call them
"maybe" trusts. Depending on what the evidence proves regarding the de-
positor's intent in creating the form of the account, there may be no trust at
all, a revocable trust, or an irrevocable trust.80 Most courts resort to a pre-
sumption that such an account constitutes a revocable trust.
(2) The account may be opened in the names of the depositor and
one or more additional persons. The usual form is "A or B," often adding
"or the survivor." Such accounts are called "joint" and are a frequent
source of litigation. 8 ' They may be created merely for the convenience of
the depositor, to allow the other party to withdraw funds as agent to pay
bills for the depositor. Or they may be intended to create a true joint ten-
ancy with each party presently owning part of the account with a right of
survivorship in the whole account. Or the depositor may intend to create
no ownership interest in the other party during his lifetime but to shift own-
ership to the other party if the latter survives the depositor.
(3) The account may be an obvious will substitute, opened in the
name of the depositor but payable on death to another person or persons.
When this P.O.D. account, patterned on the same form of registration of
ownership as United States Savings Bonds, was first challenged in litigation,
most courts held the account testamentary and required the balance to be
conjunction with a person having a substantial adverse interest, the trust
property to the extent it is subject to such power is also subject to the
claim of a creditor of the settlor. This subsection shall not apply to trust
property to the extent it is exempt from claims of creditors under other
statutes.
78. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment a (1959).
80. See generaly Comment, Missouris Totten Trust Doctrine, 48 Mo. L. REV. 495
(1983).
81. Because the literature and case law relating to joint accounts is so volumi-
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included in the probate estate.82 More recently, courts have permitted this
form of account to bypass probate.83 Article 6 of the Uniform Probate
Code, which has been adopted in several states that have rejected other
parts of the Code, expressly authorizes creation of accounts in this form.
84
In the absence of statute, what are the rights of the creditors of the
original depositor after his death? As to Totten trusts, creditors can reach
the balance in the account unless the trust is held to have been irrevocable
from the creation of the account.8 5 P.O.D. accounts are too new to have
been the subject of much creditor litigation.8 6 Joint bank accounts pose a
more difficult problem.
The theory on which survivorship in a joint bank account is based var-
ies from state to state and may, in turn, affect rights of creditors. Some
states view the joint bank account as a form of joint tenancy. In such states
the traditional concept that creditors of a deceased joint tenant cannot pur-
sue property owned by another joint tenant by reason of survivorship may
carry over to joint accounts.87 In other states, the theory may rest in con-
tract. The deposit agreement with the bank creates a contractual right in
the survivor, which may enable the creditors of a deceased depositor to fare
better. At death, the deceased depositor's interest passes to the survivor;
theoretically, at that point the estate becomes insolvent and the transfer is
fraudulent as to creditors. A similar argument may be made in states where
the courts base survivorship solely on statutes that protect banks in making
payment to the survivor on the joint account.
The Uniform Probate Code expressly protects creditors in all three
forms of accounts. Section 6-107 provides:
82. See, e.g., Tucker v. Simrow, 248 Wis. 143, 21 N.W.2d 252 (1946).
83. See, e.g., Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 257 S.E.2d 867 (1979)
(treating provision in banking code as creating exception to statute of wills).
84. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 6-101 to 6-113, 6-201 (1975).
85. Creditors of the original depositor can reach the balance in the account at
death under the Restatement view. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58
comment d (1959). See In re Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623 (1933); see also In
re Estate of Kovalyshin, 136 N.J. Super. 40, 343 A.2d 852 (197) (creditor of insol-
vent estate allowed to reach "Dacey" type trust of mutual funds on analogy to
Totten trust rule).
86. In his excellent article on P.O.D. accounts, Professor McGovem reasons
that creditors of the depositor should be able to recover the balance at death. Mc-
Govern, The Payable on Death Account and Other Will Substitutes, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 7,
26 (1972).
87. A typical case is Casagranda v. Donahue, 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286
(1978). The Montana Supreme Court treated the creation of a joint bank account,
not the death of the depositor, as the time at which the fraudulent nature of the
transfer was to be tested. Since death, not the creation of the joint account, put the
property out of reach of the creditor, the court refused to apply a statute governing
fraudulent conveyances even though the probate estate had no assets to pay even
funeral and burial expenses. Id. at 486, 585 P.2d at 1290.
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No multiple-party account will be effective against an estate
of a deceased party to transfer to a survivor sums needed to pay
debts, taxes, and expenses of administration, including statutory
allowances to the surviving spouse, minor children and dependent
children, if other assets of the estate are insufficient. A surviving
party, P.O.D. payee, or beneficiary who receives payment from a
multiple-party account after the death of a deceased party shall be
liable to account to his personal representative for amounts the
decedent owned beneficially immediately before his death to the
extent necessary to discharge the claims and charges mentioned
above remaining unpaid after application of the decedent's estate.
No proceeding to assert this liability shall be commenced unless
the personal representative has received a written demand by a
surviving spouse, a creditor or one acting for a minor or depen-
dent child of the decedent, and no proceeding shall be com-
menced later than two years following the death of the decedent.
Sums recovered by the personal representative shall be adminis-
tered as part of the decedent's estate. This section shall not affect
the right of a financial institution to make payment on multiple-
party accounts according to the terms thereof, or make it liable to
the estate of a deceased party unless before payment the institu-
tion has been served with process in a proceeding by the personal
88
representative.
Wider adoption of this part of the Code will at least settle any doubt as to
the rights of a deceased party's creditors to such accounts.
E. Contractual Provisions for Payment of Funds or Transfer of Property at Death
The average middle-class American has three principal forms of
wealth: a home (usually owned in joint tenancy with the spouse), a life in-
surance policy payable to named beneficiaries, and benefits under a pension
or profit-sharing plan which typically provides for payment of benefits at
the death of the employee to a beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the
employee. All three forms of wealth bypass probate.
Assume a debtor dies. He owned at death life insurance payable to his
spouse. He also had death benefits under a qualified retirement plan to
which he and his employer both contributed; the benefits also are payable
to his spouse. His probate estate is insufficient to pay claims. Can creditors,
or the personal representative suing on their behalf, reach either of these
items?
Life insurance has always enjoyed a special position. Except for chal-
lenges to life insurance trusts by disappointed spouses,8 9 life insurance has
not been questioned as testamentary. Moreover, because of the early prop-
erty approach to life insurance, an approach which treated the named ben-
88. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-107 (1975).
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eficiary as owner of an interest in the property even during the insured's
lifetime, the beneficiary has been preferred over creditors of the insured at
the latter's death.' There is, of course, no problem if the insurance was
assigned to the creditor as security or if the policy is payable to the estate.
The preference for the named beneficiary has sometimes been justified on
the ground of protection of the widow and children."' But this is, in reality,
an exemption from creditors' claims. Creation of such an exemption should
be for the legislature, not the courts, and should have a dollar limit rather
than be open-ended. 92 Where a separation agreement provides that life in-
surance policies shall remain payable to the divorced spouse and the in-
sured wrongfully changes the beneficiary designation, the divorced spouse
has an ownership interest in the proceeds, not just a general claim as a
creditor. In such a case the divorced spouse may get a constructive trust
imposed on the proceeds in the hands of the beneficiary, or the insurer if the
proceeds have not been paid over.9" Hence the normal exemption of pro-
ceeds from creditors' claims is inapplicable.
Like life insurance, retirement plan benefits seem to have a preferred
position in American law. They have special tax advantages, if the plan is
qualified. ERISA94 was enacted to assure protection for the employee's in-
terest; among other provisions, it mandates that an employee's interest must
be non-transferable and hence exempt from creditors.95 Similar provisions
are found in many state government employee retirement statutes, 96 and
general statutory exemptions for private pension and retirement plans exist
90. 2A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1341-1352 (1966); 5
R. ANDERSON, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA ON INSURANCE LAW §§ 29:113-:164 (2d ed.
1960); W. VANCE, INSURANCE §§ 122, 124 (3d ed. 1951).
91. See 2A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 90, §§ 1341-1342.
92. Existing statutes often exempt insurance proceeds but have no dollar limit.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1131 (1975). See aso R. ANDERSON, Spra
note 90, § 29:117.
93. See McKissick v. McKissick, 93 Nev. 139, 560 P.2d 1366 (1977); Simonds v.
Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 380 N.E.2d 189, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1978); Richards v.
Richards, 58 Wis. 2d 290, 206 N.W.2d 134 (1973). Unfortunately, servicemen's
group life insurance cannot be subjected to such a constructive trust because of the
federal preemption doctrine. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
94. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381
(1976).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976). A provision in the Internal Revenue Code
contains a comparable requirement in order for the plan to qualify for preferred tax
treatment. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1976). Although the statutes only require that
benefits under the plan "may not be assigned or alienated," the regulations con-
cerning the comparable tax provision interpret such wording to include a spend-
thrift clause. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1982).
96. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-781.16C, -781.22 (1974); CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 21201 (West 1980).
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in some states.97 Courts usually treat claims for alimony and support as
exceptions to such statutes.98 Does the same exemption extend to a spouse
or other person acquiring contractual benefits as a result of the employee's
death? The benefits may be payable because of death before retirement or
because the employee at retirement elected a joint and survivor annuity or
an annuity with a guaranteed number of years. In either case, a third party
beneficiary acquires plan payments by reason of the contract, and death
shifts benefits from the deceased employee to the beneficiary designated by
the decedent. Whether creditors of the deceased employee should be able
to reach those benefits is a policy issue. Usually, the family of the employee
is within the scope of any applicable exemption statute.
Contracts may shift other kinds of ownership interests at death. Sup-
pose a father sells a business, or a farm or ranch, to a son on a contract
providing that the son will pay an agreed price in installments. The con-
tract further provides that either (1) on the death of the father any balance
then owing on the contract will be deemed cancelled and full title will vest
in the son, a deed or instrument of conveyance having been placed in es-
crow to complete the transfer of title; or (2) that on death of the father all
future installments of the purchase price shall be paid to the mother if then
surviving, and if not, or in any event upon her death, to all of the children
equally. Although in the absence of a statute courts have divided in decid-
ing whether such a provision is testamentary, the modern trend is to uphold
the contract and avoid probate of the assets which are transferred at death
under the contract.99 No doubt the business context of many of these con-
tracts has influenced the courts.
Section 6-201 of the Uniform Probate Code was designed to assure the
nontestamentary nature of these various transactions. It provides:
(a) Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy,
contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, de-
posit agreement, pension plan, trust agreement, conveyance or
any other written instrument effective as a contract, gift, convey-
ance, or trust is deemed to be nontestamentary, and this Code
does not invalidate the instrument or any provision:
(1) that money or other benefits theretofore due to, con-
trolled or owned by a decedent shall be paid after his death to a
person designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a
separate writing, including a will, executed at the same time as the
instrument or subsequently;
(2) that any money due or to become due under the instru-
97. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.18(31) (West Supp. 1982-1983). See gener-
aly Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 822-24 (1974).
98. Cases are collected in 1979 Wis. L. REv. 277, 280 n.14. Courts have
treated support claims as an implied exception to the ERISA anti-assignment stat-
ute. See A.T.&T. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Senco of Florida, Inc. v.
Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
99. See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Anchonda, 22 Ariz. App. 332, 527 P.2d 109 (1974).
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ment shall cease to be payable in event of the death of the prom-
isee or the promisor before payment or demand; or
(3) that any property which is the subject of the instrument
shall pass to a person designated by the decedent in either the
instrument or a separate writing, including a will, executed at the
same time as the instrument or subsequently.
(b) Nothing in this section limits the right of creditors under
other laws of this state."m
The issue is what rights subsection (b) preserves. Note that the subsection
does not itself purport to create rights. What subsection (a) does, however,
is to eliminate those assets from the probate estate where legal process for
presenting and paying claims is provided. By another section, the Code
bars levy of execution on estate assets but not on nonprobate assets.' 0 ' But
if prior to the debtor's death a creditor has not reduced his claim to judg-
ment, whom can he sue? Only the personal representative, and the judg-
ment would be against the representative in his representative capacity.
How could it then be collected out of nonprobate assets? What "other laws"
confer rights on creditors? The Code provides no answers.
III. CONCLUSION
There are two options. One is to do nothing and leave the law in its
present uncertain and unsatisfactory state, in hope that courts will eventu-
ally work out a theory along the lines suggested in this Article: that effect
should be given to the realities of nonprobate arrangements rather than to
technical property doctrine; that realistically these arrangements shift eco-
nomic benefits at death and a transfer therefore takes effect at that time;
and that any such transfer is necessarily fraudulent as to creditors if the
probate estate is insufficient to meet their claims.
The other option is to construct and enact a statutory solution along
the lines of section 6-107 of the Uniform Probate Code, with a delineation
of nonprobate assets which should be available to the personal representa-
tive to satisfy presented claims if estate assets are insufficient. This would
require appointment of a personal representative even if there are no pro-
bate assets to administer. In this latter case the lack of probate assets to pay
administration expenses means that these in turn must be recovered from
nonprobate assets. The statute should include either some system for equi-
table apportionment among recipients of nonprobate assets or a statutory
scheme like abatement to determine the order in which nonprobate assets
can be reached.
Joint tenancies pose special problems, because the original contribu-
tion for the purchase of the property may have come from the decedent,
from the surviving joint tenant, or partly from each. Whether to treat the
transfer at death as a transfer of a half interest or of the interest attributable
100. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-201 (1975).
101. Id. § 3-812.
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to the decedent's contribution is the same issue involved in estate taxation.
There is much to be said for the simple rule that a transfer at death involves
in reality a half interest (or the appropriate fraction if there are more than
two joint tenants) regardless of contribution, because that is the interest the
creditor could reach immediately prior to the death of the debtor, unless the
joint tenancy itself was a fraudulent conveyance.
The purpose of this Article has been to call attention to what I perceive
as a basic problem in the growth of nonprobate arrangements: the removal
of assets from the administration process designed to provide a remedy for
creditors at the debtor's death. I have also suggested what I believe is a
viable theory by which creditors can pursue such nonprobate assets, despite
existing precedent which often seems to limit recovery to the probate estate.
Finally, I have advanced the basic outline of a possible statute, although I
confess that I am not optimistic about support for such a statute. My good
friend Bill Fratcher, whom we honor with this issue, would no doubt re-
mind me that the problems are ancient and will still be with us long into
the future.
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